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EPA ENJOINED FROM USING CONTRACTORS
TO INSPECT EMISSION SOURCES

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-CLEAN AIR ACT: An employee of a
private company under contract with the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to aid in carrying out oversight inspections is not an
authorized representative of the EPA Administrator under the Clean
Air Act. Stauffer Chemical Co. v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency,
647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981).
The Stauffer Chemical Company (Stauffer) owns and operates the
Leefe Plant, a phosphate ore processing plant near Sage, Wyoming.
Many of the processes used at the Leefe Plant involve trade secrets
discernable through observation of the equipment at the plant. To
safeguard its confidential methods, Stauffer has generally denied access to areas of the Leefe Plant that use trade secrets and confidential
processes. Stauffer has permitted, however, entry by EPA employees
and state Department of Environmental Quality employees carrying
out their statutory responsibilities to conduct oversight inspections
at the Leefe Plant.'
An EPA inspection team arrived unannounced at the Leefe Plant
on April 10, 1980. The team consisted of an EPA environmental engineer, an official of Wyoming's Division of Air Quality, and two employees of GCA Corporation, a North Carolina firm under contract
with the EPA to aid in oversight inspections.2 The EPA engineer was
to be present at all times to supervise the GCA consultants who were
to conduct the inspection. To protect its trade secrets, Stauffer refused to admit the team unless the GCA consultants signed a nondisclosure and hold harmless agreement.3 The EPA team refused to
comply with Stauffer's conditions and left the plant.
The EPA sought an administrative search warrant after a month of
negotiations with Stauffer proved futile. The warrant issued ex parte.
1. Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978& Supp. III
(1979), the EPA conducts oversight inspections to evaluate the effectiveness of state inspection and regulatory procedures and to assess compliance with the act by major sources of air
pollution within each state.
2. The EPA uses independent contractors to conduct such inspections to free EPA employees for other tasks.
3. Such an agreement would impose a duty of confidentiality on EPA contractors with
regard to information obtained during a plant inspection. Breach of that duty could result
in liability for any damages arising therefrom.
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The EPA inspection team, including the GCA employees, attempted
to execute the warrant on May 13, 1980. Stauffer again refused entry
to the team unless the GCA contractors signed nondisclosure agreements. The team again refused to accept Stauffer's conditions and
left the plant.
In Stauffer Chemical Co. v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, the
chemical company brought suit in federal district court to quash the
warrant and to enjoin its execution.4 The court immediately issued a
temporary restraining order. Later, the district court permanently enjoined the EPA's use of GCA or other employees of companies under
contract with the EPA in inspections at the Leefe Plant. The EPA appealed the injunction to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The issue before the court of appeals in Stauffer was whether an
employee of a private firm under contract with the EPA is an "authorized representative" of the EPA Administrator for the purpose of
assisting in oversight inspection of emission sources under § 11 4(a)(2)
of the Clean Air Act.' That section provides that "the Administrator
or his authorized representative, . . . shall have a right of entry to,
upon, or through any premises ... and may at reasonable times have
access to and ... inspect any monitoring equipment or method ... "

(emphasis added). 6 The act, however, does not define "authorized
representative."
Stauffer contended that the act does not empower private contractors to enter plant premises. The EPA argued that legislative intent
could best be determined by applying the "plain meaning" test,
which looks to the ordinarily understood meaning of a statutory
phrase to determine its legal significance. The plain meaning of
"authorized representative," the EPA asserted, is one duly authorized
to act or speak for another. The court of appeals refused to apply
such a literal interpretation and turned to the legislative history of
the act for guidance. 7
The court focused on § 116 of the senate bill that ultimately provided the substance of § 114(a)(2) of the act. Section 116 "authorized entry and inspection by DHEW [Department of Health, Education and Welfare] personnel of buildings, facilities, and monitoring
equipment . . ." (emphasis added). 8 DHEW administered the act

4. The caption of the case in the district court was In re Stauffer Chem. Co., No. M80017 (D. Wyo. June 24, 1980), 11 Envt'l L. Rep. 20560 (June 1981).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
6. Id.
7. 647 F.2d at 1078.
8. H.R. (Conf.) Rep. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5356, 5380.
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before Congress created the EPA. The court therefore read DHEW
personnel to mean EPA personnel. 9
The EPA contended that the senate language did not explicitly
limit the authorization to DHEW personnel. The court rejected this
argument, stating that an affirmative grant of authority to a specified
group precludes a grant of that same authority to another group."0
The court also looked to the legislative history of §308 of the
Clean Water Act for further guidance.'" The Report of the Senate
Public Works Committee on § 308 stated that:
the authority to enter, as under the CleanAirAct, is reserved to the
Administrator and his authorized representatives which such representatives must be full time employees of the EnvironmentalProtec-

tion Agency. The authority to enter is not extended to contractors
with the EPA in pursuit of research and development (emphasis
added).' 2
The court found the legislative history of §308 persuasive and
supportive of its holding because of the close subject matter relationship between the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act.' I The court
reasoned that to rule that an employee of a firm under contract with
the EPA could be an authorized representative under the Clean Air
Act, but not under the Clean Water Act would be anomalous. The
Stauffer court therefore held that only EPA personnel were authorized to conduct inspections under § 1 14(a)(2).' 4
The court of appeals emphasized that the question before it was
not firmly settled because of the Clean Air Act's internal inconsistencies. The court also acknowledged that its holding was contrary to
the holdings of Bunker Hill Co. v.EPA'" and In re Aluminum Co. of
9. 647 F.2d at 1078.
10. Id.
11. Section 308 of the Clean Water Act, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1976,
Supp. 1 1977, Supp. 11 1978), provides that "the Administrator or his authorized representative, . . . shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any premises . . . and may at
reasonable times have access to and . . . inspect any monitoring equipment or method ...
(emphasis added). This language is identical to that in § 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act.
12. S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &(
AD. NEWS 3668, 3729.
13. The legislative history of § 308 was published two years after § 114(a)(2) of the
Clean Air Act. The court noted that such post-enactment legislative history generally receives
less weight than history connected with the enactment of the statutory language under scrutiny. Nonetheless, the close subject matter relationship between the two acts led the court
to rely on the legislative history of § 308.
14. 647 F.2d at 1079.
15. Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, No. 80-2087 (D. Idaho October 15, 1980). The decision
was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, No. 80-3446, where arguments have been heard and an
opinion is pending.
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America.16 The Stauffer court's holding is also squarely opposed to

that of the Middle District of Tennessee in United States v. Stauffer
Chemical Co., 17 a case involving one of Stauffer's facilities in Tennessee.
The United States Supreme Court will likely consider the § 114(a)
(2) issue because of the differing constructions that section is receiving in the federal courts."a Resolution of the issue could have a significant impact on the EPA's oversight capabilities. The monitoring
mandated by the Clean Air Act may be severely impaired if the
Stauffer reasoning is upheld and if proposed cutbacks in federal
agency funding result in a reduced EPA staff.
KIM A. GRIFFITH

16. In re Aluminum Co. of America, No. M-80-13 (M.D. N.C. July 9, 1980). On appeal
before the Fourth Circuit, No. 80-1599, the cause was remanded with instructions on October 29, 1981.
17. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 511 F. Supp. 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). Decided
several weeks before the principal case, this case upheld the EPA's authority to use nonagency employees in oversight inspections under § 114(a)(2). The Tennessee district court
reasoned that the "authorized representative" language of that section, when contrasted
with other provisions of the act which used the terms "officers and employees," must be interpreted to permit entry by non-agency employees. The court found the legislative history
of the Clean Water Act to be of questionable relevance and determined that sufficient protection against disclosure by EPA contractors existed to render unfounded Stauffer's fears
of exposure of its proprietary processes.
18. Although the government did not petition for certiorariin Stauffer, the Bunker Hill
and Aluminum cases, supra at n. 15 and n. 16, respectively, may be vehicles for presenting
this issue to the Supreme Court.

